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Abstract
This paper shows how a firm can use non-targeted advertising to ex-
ploit consumers’ desire for social status. A monopolist sells multiple va-
rieties of a good to consumers who each care about what others believe
about his wealth. Advertising allows consumers both to buy different
varieties and to recognize them when others buy.
In equilibrium, the firm advertises each variety to those who will buy
but also to all poorer consumers who will not, so that they understand
what having the goods signals. If concern for status is sufficiently high,
then the firm will only place a single variety on the market.
1 Introduction
Firms sometimes advertise high-end goods to a broad public, at a price that
most people cannot afford. For instance, some firms use broad advertising for
expensive new cars. Audi spent six million dollars to advertise its $118 000 R8
during the broadcast of Super Bowl XLII, reaching almost one hundred million
viewers.1 Prior to the 2008 Formula 1 Canada Grand Prix, Honda showcased
its $100 000 Acura NSX at a popular street festival attended by hundreds of
thousands of visitors.2
Other firms use broad advertising for high-end designer clothes. The first
three selections in Vogue magazine’s 2008 fall fashion section were a $1200
trenchcoat, a $5500 watch and $600 shoes. Handbags cost between $1700 and
$3300.3 Twenty out of thirty-five items from Elle’s fall fashion section cost over
∗I would like to thank my supervisor Maarten Janssen, Bauke Visser, Stefano Puntoni,
Chaim Fershtman, Tore Ellingsen and Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda for helpful comments, as well as
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1Brandweek, 12/15/2008, Vol.49, Issue 44 p6-6
2www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/June2008/03/c7902
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$700, including a Peacock feather skirt for $2500.4 Both are mass circulation
magazines, with a readership of approximately one million.
Similarly, large advertising campaigns made Nike Air Jordan shoes and the
Apple iPhone household names, even though both were mainly competing with
high-end brands.5
The firms sending these ads could not reasonably expect most consumers
they reach to buy their products. Since advertising is costly, it would seem
more efficient to target ads at specific groups of consumers who are more likely
to buy. This is, after all, what firms often do. They can put great effort into
selecting which of distinct audiences to reach via specialized cable television,
satellite radio, and magazines (Esteban et al. 2006).
It is often possible for firms to use targeted advertising, because targeting
technology continues to improve. Different households watching the same pro-
gram on cable tv may simultaneously receive different ads, and someone surfing
the internet will receive ads based on his personal browsing history and the ex-
act search query typed into Google or Yahoo (Johnson 2009). What then makes
the above examples of non-targeted advertising so different?
This paper puts forward an explanation for non-targeted advertising, which
I define here as advertising to people who the firm does not expect to buy the
good. This explanation is based on two ideas. First, consumers value social sta-
tus, which depends on what other consumers believe about their wealth. Second,
advertising informs consumers in two different ways. It informs consumers of
the existence of goods and allows them to buy, and it also allows consumers to
recognize goods when bought by others.
Recognizing essentially means that consumers can identify a good for what
it is when they see it. An uninformed consumer who sees a state of the art
smartphone might confuse it with a standard phone. However, a consumer who
recognizes the smartphone will not make that mistake, and may infer some-
thing about the owner as someone who owns a high-end good. In this way,
non-targeted advertising may encourage conspicuous consumption by helping
consumers signal to each other through their purchases.
Some features of this explanation appear in previous economic analysis of
social status, such as Veblen (1899), Frank (1985), Ireland (1994) and Bagwell
and Bernheim (1996). Status depends on beliefs about an unobserved charac-
teristic, such as wealth or ability, and actions only affect status to the extent
that they influence beliefs. High status is associated with a high level of the
characteristic, either in absolute terms or compared to some reference point.6
These papers emphasize that signaling through consumption is only possible
if goods are visible to others, since only then can consumption influence beliefs.
I take the approach that physical visibility is not enough. Consumers must also
recognize the good to understand what having it means, creating a role for non-
4www.elle.com/fashionspotlight
5Advertising Age, 6/25/2007, Vol. 78, Issue 26, p8-8
6The mechanism would not work if people liked to conform as in Bernheim (1994), or
disliked inequity as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). But Kapferer and Bastien (2009) argues that
people’s desire for social stratification is the driver for luxury good sales.
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targeted advertising. Non-targeted advertising could only promote signaling for
physically visible goods, which suggests why the above examples of advertising
may be different. Cars, clothes and portable technology all tend to be highly
visible.
The economics literature on advertising has largely ignored the possibility
that a firm can use broad non-targeted advertising to exploit consumers’ desire
for social status, by allowing them to signal through their purchases. A number
of authors in other fields, particularly marketing, have nonetheless alluded to
this type of mechanism. Their arguments are informal, and often presented in
terms of strengthening brand image. A brand is an idea, and the idea is more
powerful if widely shared. More people should therefore be familiar with the
brand than just the consumers who buy (Kotler and Keller 2008). It is precisely
because everyone knows BMW and what it stands for, even those who will never
buy a BMW car, that the brand has so much power (Kapferer 2008).
Kapferer and Bastien (2009) make a similar point in the specific context of
luxury goods. They espouse what they call an anti-law of marketing, that many
more people should be familiar with a luxury brand than those who are likely
to buy. They contrast this approach to traditional advertising campaigns which
focus only on the target market.
Miller (2009) makes a similar argument, which is clearly expressed in the
following passage:
The luxury brands with the highest brand equity ... advertise
in Vogue and GQ not so much to inform rich potential consumers
that they exist, but to reassure rich potential consumers that poorer
Vogue and GQ readers will recognize and respect these brands when
they see them displayed by others. (Miller 126)
To the best of my knowledge, only two papers in the advertising literature
have modeled how advertising can help consumers signal through their pur-
chases. The first such paper is Wernerfelt (1990), which uses a very different
framework than I do in this paper. I assume all consumers want to be thought
of as wealthy, while Wernerfelt considers horizontal differentiation where all
consumers want to reveal their type, and where firms compete in advertising
to name brands. Advertising effectively allows a firm to engage in cheap talk
and suggest the meaning of a brand. Consumers of different types can then
coordinate on the brands which best express their identify.
In a short section, Wernerfelt also looks at vertical differentiation and ar-
gues that advertising can help sustain an equilibrium by dissipating profits in a
repeated setting. The reasoning is that firms who only sell to high types may
want to sell the “afterglow” of their brand’s positive signal to low types in a
future period, which can cause an equilibrium to break down. Allowing firms
to earn positive profits could make this deviation unattractive, but that would
encourage entry. He argues that an alternative way to support the equilibrium
is to assume that high types will only buy from firms with the most advertis-
ing, in precisely such a way so as to make expected profits equal zero. This
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relationship between advertising and consumer beliefs seems rather ad hoc, and
Wernerfelt admits the approach is not completely satisfactory.
A paper more similar to the current work is Krahmer (2006). He looks at
duopoly, where firms compete in prices and advertising, and where each firm
sells a single brand. Consumers are either high or low type, and they derive
social status if members of “the public” believe their type is high. Members of
the public can only recognize a brand if they have received an ad, so that the
role of advertising is to inform the public of brand names.
Krahmer shows that equilibrium advertising tends to be higher than the so-
cial optimum, and this effect is exacerbated by competition. In monopoly, a firm
overadvertises because it does not internalize how ads reduce the social status
of low types who do not buy. In duopoly, an incumbent may also overadvertise
to deter entry, knowing that the entrant must outadvertise him to make any
sales. If two firms are active in the market, then they may also waste resources
competing with each other for high types.
The basic mechanism in this paper is similar to Krahmer, but there are
a number of important differences which lead to new results. First, I do not
look at duopoly, but rather at a monopolist who sells multiple varieties. This
different setting leads to new strategic considerations for the firm, as it must
consider how its choice of advertising will affect competition between its own
varieties. For instance, these considerations might make broad advertising of
high-end varieties unattractive, as the firm will also want to sell varieties to
lower types.
Second, a novel assumption of this paper is that advertising can simulta-
neously play two roles: allowing consumers to buy, and allowing consumers to
signal through their purchases. Krahmer only considers the second role of adver-
tising. In his setting, there is no need to inform consumers about the existence
of brands, because consumers are already fully informed. Advertising is instead
aimed at the public, whose members never buy anything but whose beliefs will
determine consumers’ social status.
When taken together, these two features of the model generate a trade-off in
the firm’s choice of advertising that has not been considered before in the liter-
ature. Broad non-targeted advertising makes varieties widely recognized, which
facilitates signaling and increases willingness to pay through status effects. But
it also informs individual consumers about different varieties which effectively
compete with one another. This reduces the firm’s ability to price discrimi-
nate, forcing it to reduce the mark-ups of varieties sold to higher types. The
firm must therefore weigh its desire to exploit status effects against its desire to
price discriminate. This trade-off is what drives the paper’s main results.
I show that in equilibrium, the firm will advertise each variety to all con-
sumers who buy, and also to all lower types. The model therefore predicts that
poor people will receive more ads than wealthy people, but mostly for varieties
they cannot afford. It also predicts that a person will be better able to dis-
tinguish between different people who are wealthier than him, than between
different people who are poorer.
In particular, the firm will advertise the variety bought by the highest types
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to all consumers. This is the case even if the firm fully internalizes the negative
effect this has on the status of low types, and even though status is a zero sum
game. The intuition is that these ads transfer status utility between consumers
who buy different varieties, but they also affect consumers’ outside option. It
is the latter effect which leads to higher profits, by effectively increasing the
stigma associated with buying nothing.
In equilibrium, the firm will use some non-targeted advertising even for the
variety bought by very low types. It does so even though these ads make low
types easier to recognize and they suffer from low social status. The intuition
is that advertising high-end varieties generates an unraveling effect. If the firm
broadly advertises the varieties bought by all higher types, then a slightly lower
type will be willing to pay to distinguish himself from those who are still lower
than him.
This unraveling effect implies that the best way for the firm to exploit status
effects would be to advertise each variety as broadly as possible, so to all con-
sumers. However, doing so would reduce the firm’s ability to price discriminate,
because high types would prefer to buy cheaper varieties that are better deals.
The firm balances these concerns by advertising each variety to some, but not
all, of consumers who will not buy: to poorer consumers, but not to wealthier
consumers.
The firm’s desire to exploit status effects does more than influence its choice
of advertising. It can also cause the firm to restrict the number of varieties it
places on the market. If consumers care enough about social status, then the
firm will choose to sell only a single variety. In such a situation, the firm prefers
to abandon any attempt to price discriminate and instead fully exploit status
effects. As noted above, this can be done by advertising each variety to all
consumers. Advertising is costly, so the cheapest way to do so is to sell a single
variety.
The only comparable result in the literature is Rayo (2005), who also shows
a monopolist may restrict the number of varieties to exploit status effects. His
mechanism is very different, however, as consumers are already informed about
all goods and there is no role for advertising. Moreover, the two models pre-
dict the firm will restrict the number of varieties in opposite situations. Rayo
shows that differences in consumer valuation for status must be sufficiently
large, whereas here, these differences must be sufficiently small. I go into this
comparison in more detail later in the analysis.
Finally, I show that non-targeted advertising makes some consumers worse
off even though they enjoy high equilibrium status. If the firm can only sell
a single variety, then a ban on non-targeted advertising will increase social
welfare by encouraging the firm to expand output. Nonetheless, a general tax
on advertising would be counterproductive. Any tax large enough to influence
the firm’s behavior will actually decrease social welfare.
As in Krahmer (2006), this paper shows that non-targeted, informative ad-
vertising can generate effects more often associated with persuasion. It can
increase willingness to pay through status effects, and also help differentiate
largely similar goods.
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Informative advertising transmits product information such as price, avail-
ability, characteristics or quality. It is direct if such credible information is
directly included in the ad, as in Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
and Meurer and Stahl (1994). Informative advertising is indirect if it serves as
a signal, for example of price (Bagwell and Ramey 1994) or quality (Milgrom
and Roberts 1986, Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984).
Persuasive advertising directly affects consumer preferences or utility. Ad-
vertising may actually change consumer preferences (Dixit and Norman 1978),
or enter directly into the utility function as a complement to consumption
(Stigler and Becker 1977, Becker and Murphy 1993). That can reflect the idea
that advertising itself creates prestige or differentiation from other goods.
Advertising in this this paper is direct and purely informative. It can be
thought of as transmitting information about a variety’s existence, where it can
be purchased, its appearance, price, or what type of people are likely to buy it.
Broad, non-targeted advertising informs people about a variety, strengthening
the signal from buying and changing the social status with which it is associated.
Non-targeted advertising also increases the difference in status between differ-
ent varieties, by making consumers in each market segment easier to identify.
Krahmer (2006) shows that this allows a firm to differentiate its brand from
those of rivals, whereas I show it allows a monopolist to increase differentiation
between its own varieties.
Various other explanations have been put forward for non-targeted advertis-
ing. Targeting may simply be impossible because of imperfect technology, but
that is not convincing for cases where the lack of targeting is extreme.
A related reason is that perfect targeting may be too costly. Advertising
costs differ, and the cheapest way to reach a target market might be to advertise
in media with a broader reach. Hernandez-Garcia (1997), Esteban et al. (2001),
and Esteban et al. (2006) look at this cost reason and conclude that under quite
general circumstances, targeting is still optimal.
Another type of explanation relates to anchoring. A consumer may feel
something is a better deal if he knows about similar but more expensive goods.
That is, the utility from a particular choice may depend on the salient available
alternatives (Swinkels and Samuelson 2006). Though plausible, this cannot
explain why a firm would advertise to consumers who it does not expect to buy
any of its products.
Finally, firms may advertise to signal product characteristics. Seemingly
wasteful advertising may itself signal high quality (Nelson 1974). The mecha-
nism here differs in that advertising does not signal anything, but instead helps
consumers signal to one another. It is therefore not limited to experience goods,
whose characteristics cannot be observed before purchase.
This work can also be related to models of consumption with network ex-
ternalities. There, advertising can help consumers coordinate on purchases by
acting as a public signal or promoting common knowledge about a product (Pas-
tine and Pastine 2002, Chwe 2001). Here, consumers care not about who else
buys a particular good, but who is believed to do so.
In a more general sense, this paper is related to the consumer research lit-
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erature on symbolic consumption. Levy (1959) argues that possessions are not
only important for what they are, but also for what they mean. People may
consider possessions as an extension of the self, and they can help both to de-
velop one’s self-concept and to signal it to others (Belk 1988). In particular,
consumers often mention clothing, perfume and cars as means of self-expression
(Aaker 1996).
In reality, ads for high-end goods may not explicitly state the price, which
might seem odd if firms want to stimulate conspicuous consumption. That being
said, firms often use their ads to explicitly portray what type of people are likely
to buy their goods, and it is these beliefs that matter for social status. Ads often
depict carefully selected lifestyle categories of consumers, so consumption choices
can tell us a person’s social type (Englis and Solomon 1995). For example, ads
of Louis Vuitton suggest a connection with wealth and sophistication. Indeed,
when visibility is high, signaling lifestyle is an important feature of many goods
(Levy 1963). Firms can also suggest that certain reference groups are important
by using obvious group members as spokespersons in advertisements (Kotler and
Keller 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
and Section 3 analyzes the case of a single variety. Section 4 considers the
general case where the firm can sell multiple varieties. Section 5 looks at how
selling the status good affects welfare, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are
in the appendix.
2 The Model
A monopolist sells up to 푁 ≥ 1 varieties of a status good, where 푁 is exoge-
nous. It produces each variety at constant marginal cost, normalized to zero.
Consumers are initially uninformed about these varieties, which are new on the
market.
Consumers differ only in their type 휃, which is uniformly distributed on
[휃퐿, 휃퐻 ] with 휃퐿 ≥ 0. Willingness to pay varies with type, which can be seen as
a proxy for wealth. Each consumer’s type is private information.
For each variety 푥푗 , the firm sets price 푝푗 and decides to which consumers
it will advertise. The advertising technology allows the firm to directly choose
which types will receive an ad, 푎푗 ⊆ [휃퐿, 휃퐻 ]. The strategy of the firm, 푆푓 , is
therefore a choice of 푝푗 and of a set 푎푗 for each 푥푗 , 푗 = 1, . . . , 푁 .
A consumer of type 휃 becomes informed about variety 푥푗 if he receives an
ad for it, 휃 ∈ 푎푗 . Let 퐼휃 denote the set of varieties of which type 휃 is informed,
given the firm’s advertising.
Type 휃 can buy one unit of a single variety, and only of a variety of which he
is informed. He can also decide to buy nothing. Buying nothing can be viewed
as actually buying from a known, no-name seller who does not advertise, where
competition has driven price down to marginal cost (see Krahmer (2006)).
After receiving the ads, type 휃 makes a conjecture about what other con-
sumers will believe about his type, conditional on his purchase. This conjecture
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is relevant because his eventual social status will depend on these beliefs. Type
휃 then makes a purchase.
The strategy of type 휃, denoted by 푆휃, is therefore a rule which, for any
choice 푆푓 of the firm, selects an element 푥푗 ∈ 퐼휃. Let 푆휃(푆푓 ) denote the action
prescribed by this strategy if the firm plays 푆푓 . I assume that each consumer
observes the firm’s full strategy, 푆푓 , before making a conjecture and taking an
action. I comment more on observability of the firm’s strategy and visibility of
varieties at the end of this section, where I also present an alternative interpre-
tation of this assumption.
Each consumer then forms beliefs about the type of others, based on what
they have purchased. Variety 푥푗 is visible to type 휃 if and only if he himself has
received an ad for it, 푥푗 ∈ 퐼휃. Type 휃 can distinguish between consumers who
buy different varieties that are visible to him. He cannot distinguish between
different consumers who buy varieties that are not visible to him, or between
these consumers and those who buy nothing. The latter assumption reflects the
above interpretation of a no-name seller. For example, rather than go without
clothes, a cellular phone or an mp3 player, consumers will buy generic goods
from little known producers. These goods may be virtually impossible for an
uninformed observer to distinguish from brand-name varieties he does not rec-
ognize. He may simply not notice any difference.
Pay-offs are then realized and the game ends. I assume advertising is costly
but these costs are small. The firm will therefore take costs into account when
choosing its strategy, but their magnitude will not drive the results. To capture
this idea, I set the explicit cost of advertising to zero in the analysis, but as-
sume the firm uses the following lexicographic tie-breaking rule. If two different
strategies both yield the highest revenue, then the firm chooses the strategy
with strictly less advertising,
∑푁
푗=1푚(푎푗). Here, 푚(푎푗) denotes the measure of
set 푎푗 .
Each consumer makes the purchase which maximizes his utility, given his
conjecture about what others will believe about his type. The utility of type
휃 consists of intrinsic utility and status utility : 푈휃 = (1 − 휆)푈퐼 + 휆푈푆 . The
relative weight on status is 휆 ∈ (0, 1), which is the same for all types.
If type 휃 buys nothing, then his intrinsic utility is zero. If he buys any variety
푥푗 , his intrinsic utility equals his type minus the price:
푈퐼 = 휃 − 푝푗 . (1)
Higher types enjoy more intrinsic utility than lower types from any given
variety. Varieties are essentially identical, in the sense of each giving the same
intrinsic utility.
The status utility of type 휃 equals the average belief of all other consumers
about his type7:
7Another specification would be that utility depends directly on a consumer’s conjectures,
rather than what others actually believe. That would not affect the equilibrium outcome.
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푈푆 =
1
휃퐻 − 휃퐿
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휇휃′(휃)푑휃
′. (2)
Here, 휇휃′(휃) is the belief of type 휃
′ about the type of another consumer,
whose true type is 휃.
To complete the description of the model, I impose conditions on beliefs and
conjectures. Consumers form beliefs about each others’ type, whenever possible,
using Bayes’ rule.
Consider a given candidate equilibrium and suppose the firm plays 푆푓 , which
need not be its equilibrium strategy. Let 푆휉(푆푓 ) be the action that is then
prescribed by type 휉’s equilibrium strategy. The beliefs of type 휃 about another
consumer, whose true type is 휃′, are specified as follows.
Suppose 휃′ buys a variety that 휃 recognizes, 푥푗 ∈ 퐼휃. Then 휃 believes he
is the average type who would buy this variety if all consumers played their
equilibrium strategies:
휇휃(휃
′) =
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휉1푆휉(푆푓 )=푥푗푑휉∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
1푆휉(푆푓 )=푥푗푑휉
=
1
푞푗
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휉1푆휉(푆푓 )=푥푗푑휉. (3)
Suppose 휃′ does not buy any variety that 휃 recognizes, 푥푗 ∕∈ 퐼휃. Then
휃 believes he is the average type who would not buy any such variety, if all
consumers played their equilibrium strategies:
휇휃(휃
′) =
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휉1푆휉(푆푓 ) ∕∈퐼휃푑휉∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
1푆휉(푆푓 )∕∈퐼휃푑휉
=
1
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 −
∑
푥푗∈퐼휃 푞푗
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휉1푆휉(푆푓 ) ∕∈퐼휃푑휉. (4)
Type 휃 cannot use Bayes’ rule if he is informed about all varieties, expects
all consumers to buy some variety, but instead type 휃′ buys nothing. I argue in
the following section that 휃 should then believe the deviating consumer has the
lowest possible type, 휃퐿. I cannot apply standard refinements, defined in terms
of best replies, since consumers do not take any actions after forming these
beliefs. That being said, allowing for other out-of-equilibrium beliefs would not
have an important effect on the results.
Each consumer’s conjecture is correct, in the sense of reflecting the actual
beliefs others will have about his type, conditional on his purchase. A consumer
knows that others also observe 푆푓 and they form beliefs in the same way he
does. He is therefore able to correctly predict their beliefs about his type. That
means he can predict the status utility from any purchase, and make the choice
that maximizes his utility.
There is also the issue of multiple equilibria. I take the same approach as
Rayo (2005), and assume the firm can coordinate consumers on the equilibrium
which gives the highest profits.
I end this section with a discussion about observability of the firm’s strategy.
It is important that each consumer observe 푝푗 and 푎푗 of all varieties 푥푗 for which
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he receives an ad. This is analogous to signaling models of advertising, where
consumers need to observe the firm’s advertising expenditures. If a consumer
did not observe 푎푗 for the variety he ended up buying, the firm could profitably
deviate by eliminating all non-targeted advertising for 푥푗 , and the consumer
would not notice.
I assume consumers also observe price and advertising for all other vari-
eties, possibly hearing about these ads through word-of-mouth communication.
Above all, this assumption is made for practical purposes. It amounts to assum-
ing that the firm can commit to a mechanism (price and advertising for each
variety), which is designed to be incentive compatible (each consumer purchases
the desired variety). The assumption allows me to focus on the main issue at
hand, the firm’s trade-off between status effects and price discrimination when
designing this mechanism, which is something that has not been considered
before.
If the firm’s strategy were not fully observable, then I would have to specify
beliefs following a deviation by the firm. The question is what a consumer should
believe about the ads he does not see, after himself receiving an unexpected ad.
More generally, if one player notices that another player has deviated from
his equilibrium strategy, but does not observe the full deviation, what should
he believe this deviation actually was? Questions of this nature have been
considered before, including by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Rey and Verg
(2004), but in a very different context. They look at an upstream monopolist
that supplies two retailers, where the contract with one retailer is unobservable
to the other. Retailers later compete in the product market, and each must
form beliefs about the contract offered to its rival, given the contract it receives.
These papers consider the consequences of what they call passive and wary
beliefs.
The situation here is quite different, however, and applying these concepts to
the current setting is significantly more complicated. A consumer who receives
an unexpected ad can observe who else has also received it, and he knows
that these consumers must notice the deviation. He therefore knows that these
consumers cannot retain their equilibrium beliefs. The firm can also determine
which consumers notice the deviation, and the extent to which they realize that
others notice, by its choice of advertising and hence by the deviation itself.
Moreover, unlike the situation with two retailers, consumers care directly about
others’ beliefs rather than actions. It is difficult to say what consumers should
believe in such circumstances.
An alternative interpretation of the assumption I make is that consumers
only observe the price and advertising of varieties for which they receive an
ad, but they react negatively to any deviation they notice from the firm. A
basic premise of this paper is that social relationships matter. A consumer who
notices a deviation should reason that the firm is trying to fool others, so that
they hold beliefs about type that are incorrect. The consumer may decide not
to give his business to a firm that acts in such a way. In that case, the firm will
have no incentive to deviate and equilibrium results will be identical to the case
with full observability.
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3 Analysis - Single Variety
The main focus of the paper is on multiple varieties, but it is instructive to
first consider the single variety case. Assuming 푁 = 1 demonstrates the basic
mechanism at work relating advertising to social status. It also generates a
number of new insights. In terms of notation, I will omit the subscript on 푥1,
푝1 and 푎1 since there cannot be any confusion about which variety it refers to.
If consumers did not value status, the firm would just solve the standard
problem of a monopolist facing a downward sloping demand curve. It would
never use non-targeted advertising, and instead advertise to exactly those con-
sumers who it expects to buy the good. When setting its price, the firm would
weigh how a marginal change in price would affect quantity sold against how it
would affect the revenue on the quantity it already sells.
Note that this baseline result is very different than Esteban et al. (2001),
who look at a monopolist’s incentive to target using magazines with nested
readership. They show that when advertising is random within each magazine’s
readership, the firm will sometimes advertise in magazines that reach beyond the
target market. It may do so because these magazines charge a lower advertising
price per reader. In contrast, I assume the cost of advertising is constant across
consumers, so non-targeted advertising amounts to pure waste. They also show
that a firm using targeted advertising will internalize the relationship between
its price and advertising expenditures, and so charge a price above the full
information monopoly level. This effect can be ignored in the current set-up
because advertising costs are small.
When consumers value status, the firm also has an additional incentive to
advertise compared with the baseline. It can exploit consumers’ desire for status
by advertising the good not only to consumers who buy, but also to all poorer
consumers who do not.
Proposition 1. Let 푁 = 1. Then the firm always sets 푎 = [휃퐿, 휃퐻 ]. Define
휆∗ ≡ 2휃퐻 − 4휃퐿
3휃퐻 − 5휃퐿 . (5)
If 휆 < 휆∗, then quantity sold and price are
푞 =
2휃퐻 − 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)
4(1− 휆) , (6)
푝 =
2휃퐻 − 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)
4
, (7)
where type 휃 buys if and only if
휃 ≥ 휃퐻 − 푞.
If instead 휆 ≥ 휆∗, then quantity sold and price are
푞 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿,
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푝 = (1− 휆)휃퐿 + 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿
2
), (8)
and all consumers buy.
Just like in the baseline case, the firm only sells to consumers above some
critical type. The main qualitative difference lies in the firm’s choice of adver-
tising. The firm now advertises to all consumers, so unless it serves the whole
market this involves non-targeted advertising. The intuition is as follows.
In the absence of status effects, differences in intrinsic utility mean the firm
would only sell to consumers above some critical type. For any given quantity
sold, doing so maximizes the willingness to pay of the marginal consumer.
Selling above some critical type is also optimal when consumers value status,
because it maximizes the difference between the expected type who buys and the
expected type who does not. Consumers then have a positive status incentive
to buy, since buying sends a positive signal. The signal is stronger when more
consumers recognize the good, which gives the firm an incentive to advertise as
broadly as possible.
The result reflects the intuition described in the introduction. The firm
advertises the status good to consumers who buy it, but also to others who
cannot afford it. Doing so increases the status incentive to buy, which lets the
firm increase its price.
Two additional features of the result are new compared to Krahmer (2006).
Both features stem from the fact that there are more than two consumer types.
First, the firm’s incentive to exploit status effects through advertising need not
decrease if it increases quantity sold, despite the good becoming less exclusive.
Second, consumers’ desire for social status counteracts the monopolist’s natural
tendency to restrict output, so that it serves a larger part of the market. The
interplay between status effects, advertising and output will play an important
role when considering a tax or ban on advertising, which I discuss in Section 5.
Expanding output does not necessarily decrease the status incentive to buy,
because it affects the status utility from both buying and not buying. By Propo-
sition 1, expanding output is equivalent to decreasing the critical value of the
lowest type to buy. The average type who buys is then lower, which decreases
willingness to pay. However, the average type who does not buy is also lower.
This has the opposite effect on willingness to pay, because buying nothing is
each consumer’s outside option.
The net impact of expanding output on the status incentive to buy will de-
pend on the distribution of types. Here, where types are uniformly distributed,
the two effects exactly cancel and expanding output leaves the status incentive
to buy unchanged. Regardless of the critical value, the difference between the
average type who buys and the average type who does not is (휃퐻−휃퐿)/2. Given
its equilibrium advertising, the firm prices just like a standard monopolist ex-
cept there is now an extra positive constant in each consumer’s willingness to
pay, 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)/2.
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This argument implies a firm may still want to use non-targeted advertising
for a popular good owned by many people, and even if that advertising is costly.
These ads do not have much impact on the social status of those who buy. Their
purpose is to increase the stigma associated with not buying, by ensuring that
those who buy nothing are recognized.
The impact of status effects on quantity sold can be seen by differentiating
(6) with respect to 휆. The derivative is positive, which I derive in a more
general case in the following section. The reason the firm expands output when
consumers place a large weight on status is that differences in willingness to pay
are then small. Higher types differ from lower types only in that they enjoy
more intrinsic utility from any purchase. In contrast, status is a zero sum game,
where all consumers value status to the same extent. If the weight consumers
place on status increases, differences between types will decrease and the firm
has less incentive to restrict output.
If all consumers buy, I need to specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs about some-
one who deviates by buying nothing. Proposition 1 assumes such a consumer is
believed to have the lowest possible type, 휃퐿. This assumption is natural, in that
type 휃퐿 has the greatest incentive to deviate. For any given out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, the difference between his utility in equilibrium and after deviating is
lower than for any other type. As well, the set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs
which would make the deviation profitable is larger than for any other type, in
the sense of set inclusion. This argument is very much in the spirit of the D1
refinement (Cho and Kreps 1987). The refinement cannot be explicitly applied
here however, because it is defined in terms of best responses, and consumers
do not take actions after they form beliefs.
These out-of-equilibrium beliefs are also intuitive, in that they are the lim-
iting beliefs of a sequence of equilibria where quantity sold tends to 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. If
휆 < 휆∗, then the firm does not serve the whole market and beliefs about those
who buy nothing follow from Bayes rule. As 휆 tends to 휆∗, quantity sold in-
creases and tends to 휃퐻−휃퐿. Beliefs about consumers who buy nothing become
more negative and tend to 휃퐿. In this sense, the assumption assures that beliefs
are continuous in 휆.
4 Analysis - Multiple Varieties
I now consider the general case where the firm can sell up to 푁 varieties. In
the baseline case without status effects, varieties are identical in the sense of
each giving the same intrinsic utility to consumers. However, since the firm can
choose which consumers to inform about which varieties, it can take advantage
of this situation to price discriminate.
Without status effects, the firm would choose a critical value 휃0 < 휃퐻 , and
sell to all consumers above this type.8 It would divide consumers on [휃0, 휃퐻 ]
into 푁 segments, and sell a different variety to those in each segment. The firm
8Whether the firm would choose 휃0 > 휃퐿 would depend on parameter values. It is more
likely to be the case when both 휃퐿 and 푁 are small
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would only advertise a variety to those consumers who would buy it, and so
avoid any competition between different varieties. The price for each variety
would make the lowest type to receive an ad indifferent between buying that
variety and buying nothing.
Status effects now give the firm an incentive to use non-targeted advertising
for all varieties.
Proposition 2. The firm sets critical values 휃1 ≥ 휃2 ≥, . . . , 휃푀 , with 푀 ≤ 푁 .
It sells 푥1 to all types 휃 ∈ [휃1, 휃퐻 ] and 푥푗 to all types 휃 ∈ [휃푗+1, 휃푗) for 2 ≤ 푗 ≤
푀 . The firm sets 푎1 = [휃퐿, 휃퐻 ] and 푎푗 = [휃퐿, 휃푗−1) for 2 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푀 . It sets 푝푗
to make type 휃푗 indifferent between buying 푥푗 and buying nothing.
Just as with a single variety, an important difference with the baseline case
lies with the firm’s choice of advertising. The firm still divides the market into
segments, but now advertises each variety to all consumers who buy and to all
lower types.
The driving force behind Proposition 2 is the firm’s trade-off between broad
advertising to exploit status effects, and more targeted advertising to better
price discriminate. Before discussing this trade-off in more detail, I describe a
few features of the equilibrium.
One feature of the equilibrium is that lower types receive more ads than
higher types. Poor consumers are better informed, in the sense of being able
to buy and recognize more varieties, but this does not necessarily leave them
better off. The majority of ads they receive are for expensive varieties that they
cannot afford.
Another feature is that each consumer knows more about those who are
wealthier than him, than about those who are poorer. A consumer is able to
recognize the different varieties bought by all higher types. He can make fine
distinctions between those who are slightly wealthier, moderately wealthier and
much wealthier than him, based on the different varieties these consumers buy.
In contrast, he is unable to recognize varieties bought by any lower types. From
his perspective, they simply form a single group of poorer consumers. It is not
that he is particularly interested in recognizing wealthier consumers, but rather
that the firm can profitably exploit their desire to be recognized.
Proposition 2 shows that the firm will use non-targeted advertising for the
variety bought by the highest types, even if it fully internalizes the negative
effect this has on all others. That is, even if all consumers buy some variety in
equilibrium.9
Advertising 푥1 to all consumers means the firm can increase 푝1, since all
consumers now recognize those who buy it as the highest types. Those who
buy other varieties are now recognized as not having the highest type, which
decreases their status. However, the same applies to any consumer who decides
to buy nothing, which is the most attractive outside option. Advertising 푥1
9If all consumers buy some variety, then I must specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs about a
consumer who buys nothing. Just as in the previous section, I assume this belief is 휃퐿. These
beliefs are only relevant for types 휃 < 휃푀−1, since they are the only ones to receive ads for
all varieties. The same point applies below for Proposition 3.
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to all consumers therefore decreases their utility but leaves willingness to pay
for other varieties unchanged. Non-targeted advertising works by increasing
the stigma associated with consumers’ outside option, whether or not anybody
actually takes that outside option in equilibrium.
Stronger still, exploiting status effects can be understood fully in terms of
increasing the stigma associated with buying nothing. The proof of the propo-
sition shows that firm profits can be written as the sum of two terms: profits
stemming from intrinsic utility and profits stemming from status utility. Profits
from status utility can themselves be expressed as a constant, minus a term
that is proportional to the average belief about consumers who buy nothing.
To maximize profits from status utility, the firm must make beliefs about types
who buy nothing as negative as possible.
Proposition 2 also shows that the firm will use some non-targeted advertising
for all varieties, even those bought by very low types. It does so despite the
fact that these ads make low types more widely recognized and they suffer low
social status. This counterintuitive result can again be explained by the firm’s
attempts to increase the stigma of buying nothing.
Consumers who buy nothing all have type lower than 휃푀 , which is the lowest
type to buy any variety. The firm can make beliefs about these consumers as
negative as possible by ensuring they are not confused with anybody who buys
a variety. It therefore wants consumers to receive ads for as many varieties as
possible, so they can infer that those they do not recognize are precisely those
who buy nothing.
Non-targeted advertising for low-end varieties can also be understood in
terms of unraveling. Once 푥1 is advertised to all consumers, those who buy 푥2
are the highest types that consumers may not recognize. They are willing to
pay to differentiate themselves from those who buy lower-end varieties and those
who buy nothing. The firm can therefore broadly advertise 푥2 to lower types
and increase 푝2 without decreasing the price of any other variety. By repeatedly
applying the same logic, the firm will use some non-targeted advertising for all
varieties, even the variety bought by the lowest types.
Non-targeted advertising is used to increase the stigma associated with buy-
ing nothing, but as a byproduct it also helps differentiate otherwise identical
goods. Non-targeted advertising allows consumers to better identify those in
different market segments, which effectively transfers status utility from those
who buy low-end varieties to those who buy high-end varieties. All consumers
value status to the same extent, so this transfer does not affect firm profits. The
revenue the firm loses from low-end varieties is exactly offset by the revenue it
gains from high-end varieties. The firm’s use of non-targeted advertising does
increase differentiation between varieties, but that is not the reason why the
firm follows this strategy.
The best way to exploit status effects would be to advertise each variety to
all consumers, so that everyone can precisely recognize those who buy nothing
as 휃 < 휃푀 . The firm does not do this, however, if 푀 ≥ 2, because it faces a
trade-off between exploiting status effects and price discrimination.
The firm can only price discriminate between different segments of the mar-
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ket because high types are uninformed about the varieties bought by low types.
All consumers rank varieties in the same order. Varieties bought by low types
are unambiguously better deals, because the firm must set a low price to con-
vince low types to buy. The only reason high types do not deviate is that they
do not receive ads for these lower-end varieties.
If the firm advertised each variety to all consumers, it would lose all ability
to price discriminate. In that case, it would prefer to sell a single variety, which
would at least allow it to save on advertising costs.
The trade-off between broad advertising to exploit status effects and targeted
advertising to allow for price discrimination determines the main features of
the equilibrium: non-targeted advertising for each variety, but only to poorer
consumers than those who buy.10 The following proposition shows that this
trade-off also determines the firm’s choice of critical values 휃1, . . . 휃푀 , and hence
of quantity sold of each variety, where 푞푗 = 휃퐻 −
∑푗
푖=1 푞푖. It can even cause the
firm to restrict the number of varieties put on the market.
Proposition 3. Define the critical value 휆
′
as follows:
휆
′ ≡ 2(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)− 2휃퐿푁
3(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)− 2휃퐿푁 ≤
2
3
. (9)
If 휆 < 휆
′
, then the firm puts 푀 = 푁 varieties on the market, with
∑푁
푖=1 푞푖 <
휃퐻 − 휃퐿. Quantity sold is the same for each variety, and is increasing in 휆:
푞 =
2휃퐻 − 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)
2푁 + 2− 휆(푁 + 3) . (10)
If 휆
′ ≤ 휆 < 2/3, then the firm puts 푀 = 푁 varieties on the market and
sells to all consumers,
∑푁
푖=1 푞푖 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. Quantity sold for each variety is
푞 = (휃퐻 − 휃퐿)/푁 .
If 2/3 ≤ 휆, then the firm puts 푀 = 1 variety on the market, and sells to all
consumers. Quantity sold is 푞 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿.
When concern for status is sufficiently high, the equilibrium is dramatically
different than the baseline case. Instead of selling a positive amount of all 푁
varieties, the firm prefers to sell only a single one.
The relationship between quantity sold of each variety and concern for status
is also discontinuous. When 휆 < 2/3, the firm sells a strictly positive amount
of all 푁 varieties, and each quantity is weakly increasing in 휆. But as soon
as 휆 exceeds 2/3, quantity sold jumps to zero for all varieties except one. This
result stems from how quantity sold relates to the firm’s trade-off between status
effects and price discrimination.
Profits from intrinsic utility are highest when the firm plays the same strat-
egy as in the baseline case. Profits from status utility are highest when con-
sumers have negative beliefs about those who buy nothing. This amounts to
10The proof does not make use of the fact that consumer type is uniformly distributed, and
so the result holds for a general distribution of types.
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consumers believing that those they do not recognize have low type. A consumer
who buys 푥푗 can recognize all varieties bought by higher types, and knows those
he does not recognize have type below 휃푗 . If quantity sold increases for each
variety, then 휃푗 becomes smaller and this consumer can recognize more types.
His beliefs about those he doesn’t recognize then becomes more negative.
Profits from intrinsic utility are proportional to 1−휆, and those from status
utility are proportional to 휆. When 휆 is small, the firm can strike a balance be-
tween status effects and price discrimination by still selling 푁 varieties, but with
quantity sold slightly higher than in the baseline case. As 휆 increases, the firm
increases the quantity sold of each variety. It still price discriminates between
푁 segments of the market, but the equilibrium outcome becomes increasingly
different from the baseline.
When 휆 reaches 휆′, quantity sold has increased to such an extent that all
consumers buy some variety,
∑푁
푖=1 푞푖 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. The firm is unable to increase
quantity sold if 휆 increases still further, because there is simply nobody left
to buy. It continues to play the same strategy, but becomes more tempted to
forsake all price discrimination and just maximize profits from status utility.
It could do so by selling a single variety to all consumers, so each consumer
can recognize what everybody else buys. That is exactly what occurs when 휆
reaches 2/3.
When advertising costs are small, as in this set-up, the result depends on
consumers all valuing status to the same extent. Another way for the firm to
fully exploit status effects would be to sell all 푁 varieties, but to advertise each
variety to all consumers. Because 휆 does not vary with type, the firm would lose
all ability to price discriminate, and profits would be the same as from selling a
single variety. Selling 푁 varieties is suboptimal because it involves strictly more
advertising.
If instead 휆 was increasing with type, the firm could advertise 푁 to all con-
sumers and still engage in price discrimination. In this case, high types would
be willing to pay more for status than low types. By setting the appropriate
prices, the firm could ensure that different types rank varieties in different or-
ders. It could then fully exploit status effect by advertising each variety to all
consumers, and still price discriminate between different market segments.
However, this strategy still involves 푁 times more advertising than selling a
single variety. Taking explicit account of the cost of advertising should therefore
restore the result that the firm sells a single variety.
The only comparable result in the literature is Rayo (2005). He also looks
at a monopolist selling multiple varieties to consumers who want to signal their
type. An important difference is that consumers are fully informed of all va-
rieties, so that advertising plays no role. Social status depends only on the
average type to buy, and willingness to pay for status is increasing in type. In
equilibrium, each consumer’s best outside option is therefore to buy the variety
bought by a slightly lower type.
In this setting, the monopolist may want to restrict the number of varieties
on the market and force different types to pool on the same variety. Pooling will
reduce profits from these types, but increase profits from slightly higher types
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who want to avoid the pool’s low status. For a given distribution of types, the
second effect outweighs the first if willingness to pay for status is sufficiently
convex in type.
Though there are some similarities in the set-up, the mechanism in the
current paper is very different. Here, the firm restricts the number of varieties so
that it can inform all consumers about what others buy, and fully exploit status
effects, at the lowest possible advertising cost. It will only do so if willingness to
pay for status is similar across types, which is the opposite conclusion reached
by Rayo. If the firm does restrict the number of varieties, then it will pool all
consumers onto a single one. In contrast, pooling is local in Rayo’s setting and
never involves the highest type, because there would be no higher types outside
of the pool to increase profits.
5 Welfare
I first examine how individual consumers are affected by sale of the status good.
That is, I compare the equilibrium utility of different types to what it would
be if the firm could not sell the status good. There are no externalities in the
baseline case, so allowing the firm to sell would leave all consumers weakly better
off. If any types are now worse off, then it must be because of status effects.
Proposition 4. All types who buy nothing would have higher utility if the firm
did not sell the status good. For each variety 푥푗, a strictly positive mass of
consumers who buy 푥푗 would also have higher utility if the firm did not sell the
status good. If 휆 > 2/3, then this applies to all consumers.
Selling the status good makes poor consumers who buy nothing worse off.
This is a direct consequence of status externalities. If the firm did not sell the
status good, then beliefs about all consumers would equal the prior, (휃퐻+휃퐿)/2.
Selling the status good reveals all those who buy nothing as having below average
type, since all 휃 ≥ 휃푀 buy some variety. These consumers are left worse off,
because some of their social status has been transferred to wealthier consumers.
At the same time, some types who buy each variety are also left worse off,
even some who buy high-end varieties. The reason is not that these consumers
suffer from low social status. To the contrary, consumers who buy 푥1 are now
revealed as having the highest types. The reason is that the stigma now asso-
ciated with buying nothing pushes these consumers to pay a high price. Beliefs
about those who buy nothing are more negative than the prior, and the firm
sets the price of each variety to make the lowest type to buy indifferent with
buying nothing. For each variety, there are therefore some consumers who are
willing to buy, but who would be better off if nobody did.
It can be that some consumers are also left better off by the firm selling the
status good, though that is not always the case. When 휆 > 2/3, so the firm sells
only one variety, all consumers are actually left worse off. In that case, both the
weight consumers place on social status and the stigma associated with buying
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nothing are quite large. It is large enough to convince even the lowest type to
buy, at a price which leaves even the highest type worse off.
I now turn to social welfare, defined in terms of total surplus. The explicit
cost of advertising is zero and status is a zero-sum game, which implies total
surplus is just equal to the intrinsic utility enjoyed by all consumers. Total
surplus is strictly increasing in quantity sold, and I consider whether imposing
restrictions on advertising can increase total surplus above the equilibrium level.
For tractability, I assume the firm can only sell one variety.
If the social planner could choose both price and advertising, then he would
clearly advertise and sell the status good to all consumers. A more interesting
situation is when the firm retains control over the price. Through possible
restrictions on advertising, the social planner can then encourage the firm to
expand output.
I consider two possible restrictions on advertising. The first restriction is
a ban on non-targeted advertising, so that the firm could only advertise to
consumers who will buy the good. The second restriction is a general tax on
the volume of advertising.
Proposition 5. Let 푁 = 1, and suppose 휆 < 휆
′
from (9) so that 푞 < 휃퐻 − 휃퐿.
Say there was a ban on non-targeted advertising. Then compared to Propo-
sition 1, this ban decreases 푝, and increases both 푞 and total surplus.
Say there was a tax on advertising, so that informing a mass m of consumers
cost 푐푚, with 푐 > 0. Then there exists a threshold value such that, for 푐 be-
low this threshold, the results are identical to Proposition 1. For 푐 above this
threshold, the firm only uses targeted advertising, and the tax decreases both 푞
and total surplus.
A ban on non-targeted advertising increases total surplus by providing the
firm with an incentive to increase quantity sold. In the presence of status effects,
the firm would like to inform as many consumers as possible about the variety it
sells. In Proposition 1, the firm restricts sales to consumers with sufficiently high
willingness to pay, and informs all others through non-targeted advertising. A
ban on non-targeted advertising prevents the firm from doing so. Now, the only
way to inform more consumers is to charge a lower price and expand output.
A ban on non-targeted advertising may be difficult to implement, as it would
force policy makers to differentiate between different forms of ads. An alterna-
tive would be to put in place a tax that is proportional to the total volume of
advertising. Such a tax can convince the firm to only use targeted advertising,
but the proposition shows that it would be counterproductive.
A linear tax which is sufficiently small will not affect the firm’s strategy. The
firm will continue to use non-targeted advertising and set the same price as in
Proposition 1. If the tax is sufficiently high, then the firm will switch to only
targeted advertising. The problem is that under targeted advertising, the firm
must increase advertising expenditures to increase quantity sold. A high tax
therefore leads the firm to reduce output. The proof shows that any tax large
enough to make the firm choose targeted advertising will lead to lower quantity
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sold than in Proposition 1, and so lower social welfare. The problem is that the
tax does not differentiate between targeted and non-targeted ads.11
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that consumer status seeking can explain why firms some-
times use non-targeted advertising. Advertising informs consumers about the
existence of goods and allows them to buy, but also allows them to recognize
goods when bought by others. Non-targeted advertising can promotes conspicu-
ous consumption, not through persuasion, but just by transmitting information
that allows consumers to signal through their purchases.
The results show that a monopolist selling multiple varieties will advertise
each variety to those who buy, and also to all poorer consumers. Doing so strikes
a balance between broad, non-targeted advertising to exploit status effects, and
targeted advertising to better price discriminate. If concern for status is suffi-
ciently high, then the firm will sell only a single variety. Doing so allows it to
fully exploit status effects at the lowest possible advertising cost.
An interesting avenue for further research would be to explore how the mech-
anism in this paper relates to comparative advertising, where one firm’s ads refer
to a rival firm’s products. One piece of unfavourable information about a low-
end good is that consumers who buy it are poor, so they may lose social status if
the good is widely recognized. It would be interesting to see if a rival firm selling
a high-end good might use comparative advertising to inform consumers about
the low-end good, ensuring it is recognized and thus obtaining a competitive
advantage.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a candidate equilibrium with given 푞 and ∣푎∣ = 푚 ≥ 푞.
By monotonicity of (1), the firm can set 푝 equal to the willingness to pay of the lowest
type to buy, 휃0. By (3) and (4), utility from buying is
(1− 휆)휃0 + 휆
{
(
푚
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )
1
푞
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휃′1푏휃′=푥푑휃
′ + (1− 푚
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )(
휃퐻 + 휃퐿
2
)
}
,
where the term in large brackets is the weighted average of what informed and
uninformed consumers believe about the type of someone who buys. Assuming 푞 <
휃퐻 − 휃퐿, by a similar logic the utility from not buying is
휆
{
(
푚
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )(
1
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 − 푞 )
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휃′1푏휃′=∅푑휃
′ + (1− 푚
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )(
휃퐻 + 휃퐿
2
)
}
,
which gives
11Allowing the social planner to directly choose the level of advertising would also be coun-
terproductive. It would also lead the monopolist to reduce quantity sold.
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푝 = (1− 휆)휃0 + 휆( 푚
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )
{
1
푞
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휃′1푏휃′=푥푑휃
′ − ( 1
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 − 푞 )
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휃′1푏휃′=∅푑휃
′
}
.
Given 푞, setting 휃0 = 휃퐻 − 푞 maximizes both 휃0 and the term in large brackets.
The price is then strictly increasing in 푚 so the firm sets 푎 = [휃퐿, 휃퐻 ]. Simplifying
gives
푝 = (1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 푞) + 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿
2
), (11)
휋 = 푞
[
(1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 푞) + 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿
2
).
]
(12)
Profits are strictly concave in 푞. Taking the first order condition gives
푞 =
2휃퐻 − 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)
4(1− 휆) ,
and plugging back into (11) yields
푝 =
2휃퐻 − 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)
4
.
This indeed implies 푞 < 휃퐻 − 휃퐿 iff 휆 < 휆∗, given by (5):
휆 <
2휃퐻 − 4휃퐿
3휃퐻 − 5휃퐿 .
Say instead 휆 ≥ 휆∗. Then the first-order condition is never satisfied for any
푞 < 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. For any such 푞, the firm could earn higher profits in another equilibrium
where 푞 is marginally higher.
Say the firm chooses 푞 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿, and let 휇 be the out-of-equilibrium belief about
a consumer who deviates by buying nothing. The firm can charge price
푝 = (1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 푞) + 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿
2
− 휇), (13)
evaluated at 푞 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. Profits are decreasing in 휇. If 휇 = 휃퐿, then (13)
coincides with (11), which implies profits are increasing in 푞. It is indeed optimal to
have 푞 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿, so
푝 = (1− 휆)휃퐿 + 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿
2
).
If 휇 > 휃퐿, then (13) is strictly less than (11) for any 푞. Rather than choosing
푞 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿, the firm can earn strictly higher profits in another candidate equilibrium
where 푞 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿 − 휖, for 휖 > 0 and small. As 휖 tends to zero, profits increase and
tend to (12) evaluated at 푞 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider profits in a candidate equilibrium where the firm
sells a strictly positive quantity of 푀 ≤ 푁 varieties. Denote the lowest type to buy
푥푘 by 휃푘, and order varieties such that 휃푀 < 휃푀−1 < . . . < 휃1. Let 휇푗 be the average
belief about a consumer who buys 푥푗 , and 휇푛표푡 the average belief about a consumer
who buys nothing, as given by (2).
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All consumers must rank varieties in the same order. Type 휃 obtains utility (1 −
휆)휃+ 휆휇푗 − 푝푗 from 푥푗 . He prefers 푥푗 to 푥푘 if and only if 휆휇푗 − 푝푗 > 휆휇푘 − 푝푘, which
is independent of 휃.
The incentive to buy any variety 푥푗 over buying nothing is increasing in type. If
휃0 prefers 푥푗 to buying nothing, then all types 휃 > 휃0 do as well, because (1 − 휆)휃 +
휆휇푗 − 푝푗 ≥ 휆휇푛표푡 is easier to satisfy for larger 휃.
For each 푥푗 , there must be some consumer who buys 푥푗 who is indifferent with his
best outside option. If not, the firm could increase 푝푗 by some 휖 > 0 and leave quantity
sold of each variety unchanged. Consumers who buy 푥푗 would still prefer it to their
best outside option, and those who buy other varieties now have a lower incentive to
switch to 푥푗 . That outside option is either to buy nothing or to buy another variety.
If any type who buys 푥푗 is indifferent with buying nothing, then it must be 휃푗 ,
because he is the lowest type. Furthermore, there must be at least one variety where
this is in fact the case. Otherwise, all consumers would strictly prefer their own variety
to buying nothing. The firm could then increase each 푝푗 by the same 휖 > 0 and again
leave quantity sold unchanged, because it would not change the ranking of varieties.
I group the varieties into 퐶 categories with 1 ≤ 퐶 ≤ 푀 . In each category, I
place all the varieties about which consumers are indifferent. Let 푁푘 be the number
of varieties in category 푘, and denote these varieties by 푥푘1, . . . , 푥푘푁푘 . Let 휃푘푖 be the
lowest type to buy 푥푘푖, for 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푁푘. I order varieties so that 휃푘푁푘 < . . . < 휃푘1,
so the lowest type to buy a variety from category 푘 is 휃푘푁푘 . I order the categories so
that 휃푘푁푘 < . . . < 휃1푁1 , so the lowest type to buy any variety at all is 휃퐶푁퐶 .
Type 휃푘푁푘 , the lowest type to buy from category 푘, must be indifferent between
variety 푥푘푁푘 and buying nothing. If 휃푘푁푘 was not indifferent, then any other type
휃 who buys from category 푘 would also strictly prefer his variety to buying nothing,
since 휃 > 휃푘푁푘 . The firm could increase the price of each variety in category 푘 by the
same 휖 > 0 and leave quantity sold unchanged. All consumers who buy from category
푘 would remain indifferent between these varieties, and none would want to switch
to a different category or to buy nothing. Consumers who buy from other categories
would now have less of an incentive to switch to category 푘, so the firm would not be
forced to decrease any of its other prices.
Consumers strictly prefer all varieties in category 푘 to all varieties in category 푗
whenever 푗 < 푘. The lowest types to buy from these categories are 휃푘푁푘 and 휃푗푁푗
with 휃푘푁푘 < 휃푗푁푗 . Both types are indifferent with buying nothing, but higher types
have a greater incentive to buy any variety. That means 휃푗푁푗 strictly prefers varieties
in category 푘 to those in category 푗, and all consumers have the same ranking. In
particular, this implies that the firm cannot advertise any variety in category 푘 to
consumers who buy from category 푗, for any 푗 < 푘. The consumers, having received
the ad, would then prefer to switch.
By definition, consumers are indifferent between varieties in each category. That
implies, for any 푥푘푖 in category 푘, the difference in price between 푥푘푖 and 푥푘푁푘 must
equal the difference in status utility between the two varieties:
푝푘푖 − 푝푘푁푘 = 휆휇푘푖 − 휆휇푘푁푘 . (14)
Total profits from all varieties in category 푘 are 휋푘 =
∑푁푘
푖=1 푝푘푖푞푘푖. Using (14) gives
휋푘 =
푁푘∑
푖=1
[푝푘푁푘 + 휆(휇푘푖 − 휇푘푁푘 )]푞푘푖.
The price of variety 푥푘푁푘 makes type 휃푘푁푘 indifferent with buying nothing:
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푝푘푁푘 = (1− 휆)휃푘푁푘 + 휆(휇푘푁푘 − 휇푛표푡). (15)
Substituting (15) into 휋푘 and simplifying gives
휋푘 =
푁푘∑
푖=1
[(1− 휆)휃푘푁푘 + 휆(휇휇푘푖 − 휇푛표푡)]푞푘푖.
Define 푄푘 ≡
∑푁푘
푖=1 푞푘푖, the total mass of consumers who buy varieties in category
푘. Then total profits from all categories equal
휋 = (1− 휆)
퐶∑
푘=1
휃푘푁푘푄푘 + 휆
푀∑
푗=1
(휇푗 − 휇푛표푡)푞푗 . (16)
The first summation gives profits from intrinsic utility, which depend on the quan-
tity sold in each category and the lowest type to buy from each category. The sec-
ond summation gives profits from status utility, which depend on the beliefs about
consumers who buy each variety compared to the beliefs about consumers who buy
nothing. The status incentive to buy 푥푗 is 휆(휇푗 − 휇푛표푡).
In equilibrium, the average of all beliefs, taken over all consumers, must equal the
prior:
푀∑
푗=1
(
푞푗
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )휇푗 + (1−
∑푀
푗=1 푞푗
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )휇푛표푡 =
휃퐻 + 휃퐿
2
.
Rearranging and substituting means that equilibrium profits can be written as
(1− 휆)
퐶∑
푘=1
휃푘푁푘푄푘 + 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)(
휃퐻 + 휃퐿
2
− 휇푛표푡). (17)
Keep the order of categories fixed, as well as the quantity sold of each category,
푄퐶 , . . . , 푄1. Profits from the intrinsic utility, given by the first summation in (17)
are maximized if the firm sets 휃푘푁푘 = 휃퐻 −
∑푘
푗=1푄푘. For each category, all types who
buy a variety from that category would then lie on a single interval. Having multiple
disjoint intervals of types buying from the same category would strictly decrease 휃푘푁푘
for some 푘 without increasing it for any other 푘.
Profits from status utility are also maximized by setting 휃푘푁푘 = 휃퐻 −
∑푘
푗=1푄푘,
and advertising each variety in category 푘 to all 휃 < 휃푘−1푁푘−1 . Each consumer is
then informed about the varieties bought by as many consumers as possible: someone
who buys from category 푘 receives ads for all varieties in categories 1, . . . , 푘, bought
by
∑푘
푖=1푄푘 consumers. Moreover, all of these consumers he now recognizes have
type over a threshold, namely 휃푘푁푘 . Together, this makes the average type that each
consumer does not recognize as low as possible. By (4), it makes his belief about those
he does not recognize as low as possible, and therefore minimizes 휇푛표푡. That implies
a candidate equilibria of this form gives the highest profits.
I now argue there can be only one variety per category. Say there were multiple
varieties in category 푘. From above, all varieties in category 푘 are advertised to
the same consumers. Compare profits from another candidate equilibrium where all
varieties in category 푘 are replaced by a single variety. The lowest type to buy from
any category remains the same, so profits from intrinsic utility in (17) are unchanged.
The set of types that each consumer recognizes also remains the same, so 휇푛표푡 is also
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unchanged. Profits according to (17) remain the same, but the firm now uses strictly
less advertising.
Proof of Proposition 3. Using (17) and the fact that there is one variety per
category, profits are
휋 = (1− 휆)
푁∑
푗=1
푞푗(휃퐻 −
푗∑
푖=1
푞푖) + 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)(휃퐻 + 휃퐿
2
− 휇푛표푡), (18)
where I have set 푁 = 푀 , but the firm can always choose to 푞푗 = 0 for any variety
푥푗 . The first order condition is
∂휋
∂푞푗
= (1− 휆)(휃퐻 −
푁∑
푖=1
푞푖 − 푞푗)− 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)∂휇푛표푡
∂푞푗
= 0.
As before, 휇푛표푡 is the average belief about consumers who buy nothing, which is
the weighted average of the beliefs taken over all consumers about those they don’t
recognize:
휇푛표푡 =
푁−1∑
푖=1
(
푞푖
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )(
휃퐿 + 휃퐻 −∑푖푗=1 푞푗
2
) + [1−
푁−1∑
푖=1
푞푖
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 ](
휃퐿 + 휃퐻 −∑푁푗=1 푞푗
2
).
(19)
By Proposition 2, a consumer who buys 푥푖 receives ads for all 푥푗 with 푗 ≤ 푖. Those
he does not recognize are uniformly distributed on [휃퐿, 휃퐻 −∑푖푗=1 푞푗 ]. The term in
square brackets in (19) is the combined mass of consumers who buy 푥푁 and those
who buy nothing. They all receive ads for each variety, so they hold the same beliefs.
Rearranging and differentiating gives
∂휇푛표푡
∂푞푗
=
1
2(휃퐻 − 휃퐿) (
푁∑
푖=1
푞푖 − 푞푗)− 1
2
.
Plugging into the first order condition gives
∂휋
∂푞푗
= (1−휆)(휃퐻−
푁∑
푖=1
푞푖−푞푗)−휆(휃퐻−휃퐿)
{
1
2(휃퐻 − 휃퐿) (
푁∑
푖=1
푞푖−푞푗)− 1
2
}
= 0. (20)
These are 푁 linear equations in 푁 unknowns. By symmetry, the solution is 푞푗 = 푄,
푗 = 1, . . . , 푁 , given by (10):
푄 =
2휃퐻 − 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)
2푁 + 2− 휆(푁 + 3) .
The solution is indeed interior if 푁푄 < 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. Rearranging shows this is
equivalent to 휆 < 휆
′
, as given by (9):
휆 <
2(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)− 2휃퐿푁
3(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)− 2휃퐿푁 ,
where 휆
′ ≤ 2/3. To check the second order condition, we have
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∂2휋
∂푞2푗
= −2(1− 휆), ∂
2휋
∂푞푖∂푞푗
=
휆
2
− 1, 푖 ∕= 푗.
The Hessian has two eigenvalues: ( 3+푁
2
)휆− (푁 + 1) and (3휆− 2)/2. It is negative
definite for 휆 < 2/3. Since 휆
′ ≤ 2/3, the above solution is indeed the optimum for
휆 < 휆
′
. Taking the derivative of 푄 gives
푑푄
푑휆
=
−(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)[2푁 + 2− 휆(푁 + 3)] + (푁 + 3)[2휃퐻 − 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)]
[2푁 + 2− 휆(푁 + 3)]2 .
Canceling terms, the derivative is positive if 2(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)− 2휃퐿푁 + 2휃퐻 > 0, which
holds because 휆 < 휆
′
.
If 휆 ≥ 휆′ , then we must have a corner solution with ∑푁푖=1 푞푖 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. Substi-
tuting 푞푁 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿 −∑푁−1푖=1 푞푖 into (18) and (19) gives
휋 = (1−휆)
{푁−1∑
푗=1
푞푗(휃퐻−
푗∑
푖=1
푞푖)+휃퐿(휃퐻−휃퐿−
푁−1∑
푗=1
푞푖)
}
+휆(휃퐻−휃퐿)(휃퐻 + 휃퐿
2
−휇푛표푡),
휇푛표푡 =
푁−1∑
푖=1
(
푞푖
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )(
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 −∑푖푗=1 푞푗
2
) + 휃퐿,
where I have assumed that types who buy 푥푁 hold out-of-equilibrium beliefs 휃퐿
about someone who buys nothing. The first order condition is now
∂휋
∂푞푗
= (1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 휃퐿 −
푁−1∑
푖=1
푞푖 − 푞푗)− 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿)∂휇푛표푡
∂푞푗
= 0,
where
∂휇푛표푡
∂푞푗
=
1
2(휃퐻 − 휃퐿) (휃퐻 − 휃퐿 −
푁−1∑
푖=1
푞푖 − 푞푗),
which implies
∂휋
∂푞푗
= (1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 휃퐿 −
푁−1∑
푖=1
푞푖 − 푞푗)− 휆
2
(휃퐻 − 휃퐿 −
푁−1∑
푖=1
푞푖 − 푞푗) = 0. (21)
These are 푁−1 linear equations in 푁−1 unknowns. By symmetry, the solution is
푞푗 = (휃퐻−휃퐿)/푁 , 푗 = 1, . . . , 푁−1. Using∑푁푖=1 푞푁 = 휃퐻−휃퐿 gives 푞푁 = (휃퐻−휃퐿)/푁 .
For the second order condition, we have
∂2휋
∂푞2푗
= 3휆− 2, ∂
2휋
∂푞푖∂푞푗
=
3휆− 2
2
, 푖 ∕= 푗.
The Hessian has two eigenvalues: (푁 + 1)( 3휆−2
2
) and (3휆 − 2)/2. It is negative
definite for all 휆
′ ≤ 휆 < 2/3, in which case this is the optimum. The second order
condition is violated for 휆 ≥ 2/3, regardless of 푁 . The optimal strategy must therefore
be a corner solution with 푞1 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿.
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Proof of Proposition 4. All types 휃 < 휃푁 who buy nothing have utility 휆휇푛표푡. By
Proposition 2, the lowest type 휃푗 who buys variety 푥푗 is made indifferent with buying
nothing, so he also has utility 휆휇푛표푡. If the firm did not sell the status good, then
each consumer would just have status utility under the prior, 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)/2. But (19)
implies 휇푛표푡 < (휃퐻 + 휃퐿)/2, so that these types all now have lower status utility. By
continuity, the same applies for all types 휃 ∈ [휃푗 , 휃푗 + 휖], for 휖 > 0 and sufficiently
small.
If 휆 > 2/3, then Proposition 3 implies 푞 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. The price is given by (8):
푝1 = (1− 휆)휃퐿 + 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿
2
).
Each consumer has the same status utility as under the prior, 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)/2. The
type with the highest intrinsic utility is 휃퐻 , with (1 − 휆)휃퐻 . A straightforward com-
parison shows that 휆 > 2/3 implies (1 − 휆)휃퐻 < 푝1, so all consumers are left worse
off.
Proof of Proposition 5. I use subscript 푡 for equilibrium values with targeted
advertising and 푛푡 with non-targeted advertising. From Proposition 1, 푞푛푡 is given by
(6) and 푝푛푡 is given by (7). A ban on non-targeted advertising is only relevant in the
case of an interior solution, 푞푛푡 < 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. For that reason, I assume 휆 < 휆∗ by (5):
휆 <
2휃퐻 − 4휃퐿
3휃퐻 − 5휃퐿 .
Say there is a ban on non-targeted advertising. For given 푞, the firm can set 푝
similar to (11), except now only a fraction 푞/(휃퐻 − 휃퐿) of consumers are informed:
푝 = (1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 푞) + 휆( 푞
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )(
휃퐻 − 휃퐿
2
),
휋 = 푞[(1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 푞) + 휆푞
2
].
Taking the first order condition and solving gives
푞푡 =
(1− 휆)휃퐻
2− 3휆 ,
푝푡 =
(1− 휆)휃퐻
2
.
The second order condition is 휆 < 2/3, which holds since 휆 < 휆∗. If the above
value of 푞푡 exceeds 휃퐻 − 휃퐿, then the firm sets 푞푡 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. In that case, we clearly
have 푞푡 > 푞푛푡 because of the assumption 푞푛푡 < 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. We then have 푝푡 as given by
(8), and comparing this to (7) gives 푝푡 < 푝푛푡. If 푞푡 < 휃퐻 − 휃퐿, then simple algebra
shows that 푞푡 > 푞푛푡 iff 휆휃퐻 + (2 − 3휆)휃퐿 > 0, and 푝푡 < 푝푛푡 iff 휃퐻 − 휃퐿 > 0. Both
conditions hold since 휆 < 2/3 and 휃퐻 > 휃퐿.
Now consider a tax on advertising, so that informing a mass 푚 of consumers costs
푐푚 > 0. To sell quantity 푞, the firm can set price
푝 = (1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 푞) + 휆( 푚
휃퐻 − 휃퐿 )(
휃퐻 − 휃퐿
2
),
휋 = 푞[(1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 푞) + 휆푚
2
]− 푐푚.
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The firm must choose 푞 and 푚, subject to the constraint 푚 ≥ 푞. Profits are linear
in 푚, so the optimum is either 푚 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿 or 푚 = 푞. If 푚 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿, then the first
order condition with respect to 푞 is
∂휋
∂푞
= (1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 2푞) + 휆(휃퐻 − 휃퐿
2
) = 0.
This is the same as without a tax, and so implies 푞 = 푞푛푡 and 푞 = 푝푛푡. Using (6)
and (7), profits are
휋푛푡 =
1
16(1− 휆) [2휃퐻 − 휆(휃퐻 + 휃퐿)]
2 − (휃퐻 − 휃퐿)푐. (22)
For 푚 = 푞, the profit function is
휋 = 푞[(1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 푞) + 휆푞
2
− 푐].
The first order condition is
∂휋
∂푞
= (1− 휆)(휃퐻 − 2푞) + 휆푞 − 푐 = 0,
which implies
푞푡 =
(1− 휆)휃퐻 − 푐
2− 3휆 , (23)
푝푡 =
(1− 휆)휃퐻 + 푐
2
.
For sufficiently large 푐, we have 푞푡 < 휃퐻−휃퐿. Depending on parameter values, this
inequlity may also hold for all 푐. If 푞푡 < 휃퐻 − 휃퐿 does hold, then taking into account
the cost of advertising, profits are
휋푡 =
1
2(2− 3휆) [(1− 휆)휃퐻 − 푐]
2. (24)
Comparing (23) with (6), we have 푞푡 > 푞푛푡 iff 푐 < 푐
∗, where
푐∗ ≡ 휆
4(1− 휆) [휆휃퐻 + (2− 3휆)휃퐿].
Say 푞푡 < 휃퐻 − 휃퐿, for all 푐, as given by (23). Then (22) and (24) imply
휋푛푡−휋푡 = 1
16(1− 휆) [(2−휆)휃퐻−휆휃퐿]
2− (휃퐻−휃퐿)푐− 1
2(2− 3휆) [(1−휆)휃퐻−푐]
2, (25)
which is quadratic in 푐. The firm uses non-targeted advertising iff 휋푛푡 − 휋푡 > 0.
That is certainly the case when 푐 = 0, since then non-targeted advertising is optimal
by Proposition 1. But the coefficient for 푐2 is negative, which implies 휋푛푡 − 휋푡 > 0 iff
푐 is below some strictly positive threshold.
If 푐 is below this threshold, then the firm uses non-targeted advertising and the
results are as given in Proposition 1. I now show that 푐 ≤ 푐∗ implies 휋푛푡 − 휋푡 > 0.
That is equivalent to 휋푛푡−휋푡 ≤ 0 implying 푐 > 푐∗. So if 푐 is high enough to induce the
firm to use targeted advertising, then it is also high enough to make 푞푡 < 푞푛푡. Total
surplus just depends on quantity sold, since status is a zero sum game, and so it too
will be lower.
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Note that (25) is concave in 푐, so I just need to show that 휋푛푡 − 휋푡 > 0 at 푐 = 0
and at 푐 = 푐∗. As noted above, it must be positive at 푐 = 0. Plugging 푐∗ into (25),
expanding and regrouping terms yields
휋푛푡 − 휋푡 = 휆
32(1− 휆)2 [(5휆− 4)휃퐿 − (3휆− 2)휃퐻 ]
2,
which is also positive.
Now say (23) exceeds 휃퐻 − 휃퐿 for some small values of 푐. That is, there exists
푐′ < 푐∗ such that 푐 < 푐′ implies 푞푛푡 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿. Then for all 푐 < 푐′, 푚 = 휃퐻 − 휃퐿 under
both targeted and non-targeted advertising, and 휋푛푡− 휋푡 does not depend on 푐. That
means 휋푛푡 − 휋푡 is still concave in 푐, and 휋푛푡 − 휋푡 > 0 for all 푐 ≤ 푐∗.
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